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TREACHERY AND BETRAYAL- AN ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN FIDUCIARY
BEHAVIOR OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT- THE NEED FOR
SCHOOLING IN THE BUSINESS ETHICS OF TOMORROW
G regory H uckabee, Un ivers ity of So uth Dakota
Th is article examines the fidu ciary relation ship between corporate officers and directors, and the
shareholders they serve. in recent years, th e breakdown of the fiduciary relationship and the failure of the
corporate model have received much attention, as the headlines of Wall Street's endless fiduciary scandals
adequately illustrate. What is the root of this failure, and what, if anything, are the remedies? Case
analysis will demonstrate th e pandemic problem involving fiduciary responsibility, demonstrating the need
for reform. This review will identify systemic corporate fiduciary weaknesses and underlying causes.
Recommendations for change to alleviate fiduciary fa ilure will be discussed, with fo cus placed on ethics
and need for revitalized instruction.

INTRODUCTION
Wl1en Mickey confTonted Minni e about an eye
pop ping $ 140 mi ll ion debit in th eir chec kin g account,
Minni e told him to ta lk to th eir fidu ciary, Mr. Mi cha el
Eisner, who all eged ly was mindin g the Ma gic Kin gdom 's
finances. Wl1en Mr. Eisner, CEO for the Di sney empire,
wou ld not return M ickey ' repeated phone ca ll s, Mi ckey
and severa l of hi s shareho lder fri ends fi led a deri vative
share holder suit aga inst Eisner and hi s board of directors.
In vesti ga ti on di sclosed that all wa s not we ll in the Magi c
Kingdom , and Mickey 's most tru ted business partner
may have been doing everythin g, but ac tin g in hi s and
Minnie ' s best interest.
Walt Di ney ' s board of directors, together with Mr.
Eisner, were defendants in a civil acti on in a Delaware
trial al leg in g th ey breac hed their fiduciary duties when
they blindl y approved an empl oyment agreement with
Michael Ovitz , makin g him presid ent of the Walt Di sney
Compan y. Furth ermore, it wa s all eged that a litt le more
tha n a yea r later, and aga in with ou t an y review or
de liberati on, the board of direc tor took no act ion when
Mr. Eisner entered into a non-fault termi nation agreement
wherein Mr. Ovi tz received $ 140 million from Mi cke y
and Minnie 's bank acco unt. also J.:-no,vn as. the corpora te
colTe rs. The de ri vati ve shareholder suit acc used Di sney's
fiduciarie of failing to exerci se an y business judgme nt,
and of failin g to make a good faith attempt to fu lfil l their
fiduciary ob li ga ti ons to Di sney and its stoc kh old ers (In re
Wa lt Di ney Co . Deri va ti ve Liti g., 2003).

Facts
When Eisner's seco nd -in -co mm and died 111 a
heli co pter crash, Eisner sought to replace hi m with a
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personal fTiend of twenty-five years, Mi chael Ovitz.
leWl1i Ovitz's previous business experi ence consisted of
ervice as the founder and head of a ta lent agency, he had
never been em ployed as an executi ve in any publicly
owned enterta inment enterpri e. Undaunted, Eisner
dec ided unil erall y to hire Ovitz, informing three
members of Disney ' s board of direc tors on August 13,
1995. Even though all three directors protested the hirin g,
they took no actio n. T he fo ll owin g day Eisner sent Ovitz
a lett er settin g out th e mate ri al terms of hi s prospective
contTac t as presid ent of Di sney. Prior to thi s, as the record
ren ects, neither th e board of directors nor its
compensation co mmittee ever di sc us ed hiring Ovitz for
anythin g, let alone president of the co mpan y.
After a draft empl yment co ntract surfaced , the
compensation co mmittee fin all y met to di scuss the Ovitz
propositi on. Surpri sin gly, no copy of the draft
empl oyment agreement wa s submitted to the committee.
Instead , they received a rough summary of the agreement.
No spreadsheet or an y ana lytica l document showin g the
potential co mpensation package to Ovitz, or the poss ible
cost of hi s severance package, was ever presen ted to the
comm ittee . Nor did the co mmittee request any
information or perfom1 an in vestigation as to how thi s
package co mpared with similar ones in the industry.
After a shon di scussion, the co mmittee adopted a
resolution approv in g the contract.
Three days later the fu ll board of directors met and
approved th e reso lu tion hirin g Ovitz. There were no
doc uments, let alone a draft contrac t, submitted to the
boa rd lo r its consid eration , nor did it ask for any. Wl1il e
Ovitz offi cia ll y started serving as Disney ' s president on
October I, 1995, hi emp loyment agreement was not
executed until Dece mber 12, 1995 . However, the
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effective date of the employment agreement wa s
backdated to October 1 when he began hi s duties.
The final agreement di ffe red substantially from the
earlier drafts (none of which had been reviewed by the
board or its compensation committee). The fmal
employment contract and stock option plan granted Ovitz
one million Disney shares for each of the three years of
his employment contract. F urthermore, the stock
agreement (signed on December 12, 1995) authori zed an
option price dating back to October 16, 1995 , when a
Disney share stood at $56.87. By December 12th it had
risen eight percent to $6 1.50, making Ovitz a wea lthy
Mousekateer overnight.
If this seemed too generous by industry standards,
Ovitz's contract contained a non-fault termination
provision, wherein as long as he did not act with gross
negligence or malfeasance, he wou ld receive the full
benefits of his contract. This included immediate vesting
of his three years of stock options totaling three million
shares, even if Ovitz acted ordinaril y negligent or proved
unable to perform hi s duti es. In addition , Ovitz wou ld
receive the remainder of his annual salary, and a $7. 5
million bonus for each year remaining on his contract,
even though Disney was not obli gated to pay an annual
bonus. Finally, he was to receive a lump sum tern1ination
payment of $10 mi Ilion. The tota I package rang up on the
register at $140 million. Paying so meone thi s much
money to leave the company irrespective of perforn1ance,
caught the attention of many shareholders once the good
news gone badly leaked out.
Ovitz's presidency proved unhappy from the start.
Ovitz was not accustomed to bein g second-i n-command .
Soon Mr. Eisner and Mr. Ovitz reali zed the work
arrangement was not a good "fit. " In stead of focu s ing on
learning his new job, Mr. Ovitz admitted he spent time
looking for alternative employment. If Ovitz had been
required to resign outright, Disney wou ld not have had to
pay him the severance non-fault tern1ination clause
package . Instead of choo sing this option, however, Eisner
discussed exercising the non-fault termination clause of
Ovitz's contract with him, and not surpri singl y, O vi tz
jumped at it. On December 12, 1996, O vitz's ex it fro m
Disney became public, and with onl y a year on th e job,
Ovitz and hi s non-termination c lau se package le ft
Burbank, Californi a. Like hi s employment offer, neith er
the board of directors nor the compensation committee
were consulted on the exerci se of thi s mega million deal.
Furthermore, no record exi sts of any board acti on after
the non-fault tem1ination became publi c on December 12,
1996.
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Fo ll owing a full trial on the merits and an eva luation
of the extent to which each officer and director fulfilled
their fiduciary duties; the court emphasized the
importance of the business judgn1ent rule and found that
all of the defendants were, on the facts , entitled to a
presumption of acting in good faith . T he court held that
actin g in good faith was key to a fiduciary ' s duties,
including the duty of care. The court subsequently set the
standard for finding bad faith very high , maintainin g:
A fai lure to act in good faith [may be found]

. . . where the fiduci ary intentionally acts with
the purpose other than that of advancing the
best interests o f the compan y, where the
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate
appli cable po siti ve law, or where the fiduciary
intentionall y fail s to act in the face of a known
duty to act, demon strating a conscious di sregard
o f hi s duti es (In re Walt D isney, 2005 : 15452) .
A findin g by the court that the directors had exerci sed
bad faith would ha ve deprived the directors of the
persona l liability protection/immuni ty provided by the
business judgment rule. The court repeatedly admonished
Disney 's directors for failing to live up to the ideals of
corporate governan ce, and from an aspirational level of
respon sibility, the directors should have been more
dili gent in carryin g out their duti es. Nevertheless, the
court found th at the board 's fai lure to meet these
standards did not demon strate acti onabl e bad fai th .
Perhaps because De laware is the home of corporate
Ameri ca, co urts within the state tend to be reluctant to
open a Pandora ' s Box o f fiduciary deri vative liability
suits by lowerin g the bad fa ith or its equivalency bar.

Upset M ice
So why would the multitudes of shareholder mi ce in
the Mag ic Kin gdo m be di straught over thi s state of
affa irs?
T he concern mi ght in volve the business
obligation we call " fi d uci ary du ty." Di sney share holders
have an ex pec tati on interest that their enterta inn1ent
bu sin ess wo uld be managed by a board of direc tors who
would exercise the "utmost care" whil e di scharging their
fidu c iary duti es. A fid uc iary, by defi nition is a spec ial
person in a con fi denti al re lationship who owes a lega l
duty of tru st.
loya lty,
and confidence to another. ln thi s
case, the corporate o ffi cers and the board of d irectors owe
thi s lega l du ty to Di sney's shareho lders (Mann , 2004).
A corporate offi cer or direc tor who vio lates a
fidu ciary duty may be liabl e for losses inc urred through
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its breach. A famous jurist named Justi ce Benj amin
Cardozo characteri zed the fidu c iary relati onship in 1928
in Meinhard v. Sa lmon as what one owe[s] to one
another, whil e the enterpri se conti nues, the du ty of fi nest
loya lty . . . A tTustee is he ld to somethin g stTicter than the
mora ls of the market pl ace . Not honesty alone, but the
pun ctili o of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
sta ndard of behav
ior" ( 1928: 546) .
How does that standard templ ate onto D isney's
corporate fidu ciary-directo rs? We will return to thi s later.
B ut first
, is thi s a serio us probl em worth y of further study
across the corporate ki ngdoms of today, or is Mickey 's
case an aberration, uni que and limi ted to a few bi g doll ar
magici ans? Th e foc us of thi s work wi ll address the issues
of what and how to teach ethi cs, w ith th e case studi es
provid in g justifi cation for this need .
Con tagion- Treachery and Betrayal on an Apocalyptic
Scale

Public citi zen advocate Ra lph N ader argues A meri can
corporati ons are the most pern icious forms of busin ess
orga ni za ti ons today, wh ich exp lo it in vestors, consumers,
and workers in o ur ociety, beyond anyth ing seen before
i.n Ameri can hjsto ry . Wi th thi s as backgro un d, i Disney 's
(a Fortune 500 company) recent apparent fidu ciary
breac h an aberration, or a sy mpto m of a far more seri ous
corporate lea dership proble m? T he sc ion of busi ness
econo mi cs, A dam Sm ith , in hi s "Wea lth of Nations"
presc iently o bserved , (t] he d irectors of compani es,
however, be in g the managers of other peop le's money
tha n the ir own, it ca nnot be expec ted that they should
watch over it with the same anx io us vig il ance las owners]
.... Neg li gence and profusion, therefore, mu st always
p reva il , more or less, in the manage ment of the affa irs of
s uch a company ( 1880: 326) .
If past is prologue, s hou ld we be surp ri sed to learn
be tween 1998 and January 2002, that Ga ry Win ni ck,
fou nder and c ha innan of G lobal C ross ing, o ld $73 4
mi lli on in stoc k w hil e hi s co mpany filed for banhuptcy
protection on January 28, 2002, the fourth large st
bankru ptcy in corporate hi sto ry? In 2005 , Tyco 's CEO
Denn is Kozlowsk i was fo und gui lty of 22 co unts o f grand
larceny, conspira cy, fa lsify in g bu s ines records, and
v iolating bu sinc ·s law invo lvin g mass ive fra ud - lootin g
$600 m ill ion from hi s co mpany. Toge ther w ith his C FO
Mark Schwart.G, he wa s sentenced fro m 8 to 25 yea rs in
pri son , and o rdered to repay Tyco $ 134 mi ll ion (N Y
T imes. 2005) . In add iti on, Kozlo wski wa fi ned $70
m ill ion and Sc hwa
11z
$3 4 milli on. l n June 2002 ,
Ade lphia Commu n ica tion s fi led for ba nkruptcy as it tried
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to deal with over $20 billion in debt, ongoing losses, and
accusati ons o f self-dealing by the founding family
(Gerena-Morales, 2003).O CE
fidu ciary John Rigas
subsequentl y was sentenced to 15 years in prison for
simil ar mi sconduct (Farzad , 2005) .
Should it di sturb shareholders that 208 executives and
directors from the 25 largest U.S . companies that filed for
bankrup tcy between January 200 I and July 2002 made
o ff with gross earnings of $3.3 billion, most of it realized
fro m stock sold before the company collapsed (Cheng,
2002)? How should the investor feel about executives and
directors of I ,035 corporation s, whose stock fell at least
75 percent from the hi ghs they achi eved just before 2001 ,
cashing out with $66 billion (G imein, 2002)? If there is
any remain ing doubt about greed, at the 25 corporations
where executives cashed out the most before their
scandals broke, no one now would likely be surprised to
learn 466 ins iders carri ed off a haul of $23 billion . One
mi ght sti ll ask: w here were the ir fell ow corporate officers
and boards o f d irectors whil e a ll thi s mi screant acti vity
was occurri ng?
Speaking of corporate offi cers, the Enron leadership
team tal s the bo ldness pri ze for its $680 million
with rawal of corporate equ ity. CEO Ken Lay pocketed
$67 milli on in co mpensation durin g the year prior to its
bankruptcy, Jeffrey Skilling, pres ident, rifl ed $40 million,
and CFO Andrew Fastow (who has since pl ed guilty to
fraud , receivin g 6 years impri sonment that he is currentl y
serving) made away with a mere $5.6 milli on. But the
breath ta ker is the di scovery that 140 Enron executi ves
receivin g a total o f $680 milli on, averagin g $4.7 million
api ece, for the ir fid uci ary per fo rmance o f loya lty, and
honest effoti s on behalf of the ir shareholders. N ot to be
outdone, WorldCom 's Bern ie Ebbers made o ff w ith $3 60
mi ll ion in persona l loan guarantees, whil e Qwest' s CEO
Joe Nacchio rece ived a $20 milli on severance package
after lo in g $ 100 b illi on in s hareho lder va lue (G imein,
2002).
Speaking o f CEOs' sen e of fidu c iary fidelity,
D isney 's very own Mi c hae l E isner mysteri ously saw hi s
annual compensation ri se 4 98% to $6 milli on in 2002
whil e shareho lder return fell 18%. Leo F. Mullin, Delta ' s
CEO, rece ived $ 13 .8 m illi on, a 104% in crease over the
prev ious yea r, w hile askin g the pil ots uni on to take a
reduction in previous ly negoti ated wages, concurrent
w ith a shareho lder loss in eq uity that plummeted 58%.
Mil es D. Whi te, CEO at Abbott Labs, received
$25,54 5,490 in 2002, a meager 14 7% increase amidst a
shareho lder decrease of 27% i.n stoc k pri ce. Even
depatii ng ll oneyw e ll CEO Lawrence Bossidy received a
fa rewe ll bonus o f $4 milli on whil e stoc kho lders
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experienced a share loss of 27% in 2002 (Nader, 2003).
So the question remains : who is minding the store fo r
their shareholders while all these equi ty withdrawa ls are
taking place? Apparently these corporati ons are bereft of
leaders who do not understand the ethical and fisca l
defmition of the term " fiduciary. " Do these facts reveal
an exercise of "utmost good faith " on behalf of their
stockholders, or attest to a serious conflict of interest?
HealthSouth ' s founder Richard Scrushy was accused
of even more outlandish leadership, facing 85 coun ts of
criminal behavior stemming from a $2.7 billion fra ud he
was accused of perpetrating invol ving hi s own interest.
Federal prosecutors are sought forfeiture of $279 mi lli on
in property including two luxury homes, two private
airplanes, a 92-foot yacht, a fl eet of luxury cars includ ing
a Lamborghini and Roll s Royce, and paintings by
Picasso, Chagall, and Renoir (Whitmire, 2005).elSamu
Waksal, former ImCione CEO, and tipster to one Martha
Stewart who served her own j ail time, even pled gu il ty to
insider trading during hi s equity withdrawals in volvin g
stock options (Breeden, 2003). How many CEOs and
CFOs does it take to constitute a pattern?
Round Up the Usual Suspects

The hit 1987 movi e "Wall Street" portrayed busi ness
greed at its worst in the character of Gordon Gekko
(played by Michael Douglas in an Oscar-winning
performance). Gekko was "an investor" focused on onl y
one business topic - greed - that he imparted passionately
at a shareholders meeting where he attempted a company
takeover. While one may ration ali ze the executive
fiduciary behavior addressed above as a seductive
endorsement of "Wall Street' s" Gordon Gekko mantra
"greed is good for Ameri
ca"
(hi s stated purpose at the
shareholders meeting), there may be at least one other
equally plausible explanation . For investors, says seni or
vice president and special counsel at Insti tuti onal
Shareholder Services Patrick McGurn , "poor governance
is a substantial ri sk fa ctor" (Bums, 2003) . Dow Jones
Newswires in Washington reporter Judi th Bum s sums it
up observing. When it works as it's supposed to, a boa rd
of directors looks attenti vely over the shoul ders of
executives who smartl y handl e the day-to-day busi ness
decisions, and the shareholders get a fu ll acco untin g of
the company ' s operation s and fin ances. But lately, this
model has failed in some rather spectacul ar smash-ups,
with executives acting like imperia l monarchs - operati ng
unchecked by boards, bankruptin g their co mpa nies and
leaving shareholders with nearl y worthl ess stock (B urn s,
2003).

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss2/11

Co ul d corporate model fai lure be the root cause fo r
thi s outbreak of corporate Gekkoism? If so, why is the
mode l breaking down now? A joint study by the Institute
for Po licyes Studi in Washin gton and the Boston-based
indepen dent research group United for a Fa iT Economy
report on average CEO pay rose 279% from 1990 to
2002, exceeding the 166% ri se in the Standard & Poor' s
500-stock in dex over the same period. CEO salaries are
determined by board of directors' compensation
committees . The Wall Street Journa l reports that in too
many cases today, board members have been hand picked
by the very parties they are supposed to oversee, the chief
executives. "Often in such cases, the boards approve
whatever the CEOs ask fo r- particularly big pay
packages that aren' t tied to performance" (Bums, 2003).
How true is this? Durin g 2002 "CEOs of the 350
biggest U.S. compani es enj oyed a 7% rise in their pay,
despi te an average 13% fa ll in corporate profitability
durin g the year" (Conference Board, 2002). Should
shareho lders be concerned? As one bl unt investment
manager observed in a CATO Institute report on thi s
subject, "[E]nron ain ' t the problem . . .The unremarked gut
iss ue today is that over the past decade there was a
landsli de transfer of wealth from public shareholders to
corporate managers. Enron was j ust the tip of the iceberg
ready to happen" (Niskanan, 2002).
Should shareholders reall y be concerned about payin g
140 company executives in one company $680 million?
After all, it is their money, and are we not ta lking about
the "C" word here- corruption? One key symptom of
corporate corrupti on, in fact, is runaway CEO pay.
D uring the past decade, CEO pay ha s grown from 42
times average employee pay to 531 times average
employee pay. Comparing other industrialized nation s,
Japanese CEOs make only 20 times what an average
·vorker earns, while Briti sh CEOs make 35 times, a far
cry from their colonial cousins (Conference Board,
2002) . Even management by objectives guru Dr. Peter F.
Drucker forewarned the in creasing pay gap between
CEOs and emp loyees in the earl y 1980 ' s. He observed
that such di sparity tmeaten s th e credibility of corporate
leadership, mai ntainin g that no leader should earn more
than 20 ti mes the company' s lowest pa id emp loyee.
Conundrum

So if corporate exec utive greed, COITuption , and
fiduciary duty breaches are being caused by lack of
accountability on th e part of boards of directors, handpi cked by the same CEOs, CFOs, and officers they are
sup posed to po lice, how can the cyc le be broken'7 One
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obvious so lution is to "buck up or develop fiduciaries
with an attitude" to serve on the boards of directors. A
2002 study by consultants McKinsey & Co. defmed
"good corporate governance as having a board with a
majority of outsiders who are truly independent of the
company and its managers, who have significant holdings
of the company's stock, and who are paid chiefly in
company stock or its eq ui valent. " In addition, " [f]ormal
eva luation of directors and responsiveness to investor
requests for information are other hallmarks of wellgoverned companies," claiming McKinsey (Burns, 2003).
But how can the control of CEOs over selection of
board of director members be avoided? A panel of the
Conference Board, a business research group in New
York, recommended a number of changes to improve
corporate governance. Among the changes, they
recommended "[a ]t the top of the list: splitting the role of
chairman of the board from that of chief executivepreferably with the chairman 's position filled by an
indepen dent director. Chairmen have far more than a
ceremonial role, as they set board agendas, manage
meetings and control the flow of information to the
board." McKinsey ' s research reflects that separation of
the CEO and chairman function s is the norm in Great
Britain . Their recent survey of Fortune 500 companies
found that 70% of directors favored splitting the two
roles. A Corporate L ibrary official reports about one-third
of U.S. companies have already divided th e roles (Burns,
2003).
Separation of duti es may not be suffici ent. Besides
counteractin g the "Gekko greed" factor, is there a more
deep-seated training or education defi ciency that deters
corporate leadership from e mbracing their fiduciary
duties? Fonner Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Yolcker
observed, "I was struck not too long ago when a leading
figure on Wall Street sa id to me, ' What do yo u expect
when for 20 or 30 years al l our best business sc hools
have been teaching the ideology that th e stock price is the
onl y thing that co unts.' And it wasn ' t to stretch the
coro llary far to say anythin g you can do to get the stock
price up is appropriate" (Wall Street Letter, 2003) .
If our best bu sin ess schoo ls are teach in g ' that the
stock price is the on ly thing that counts and that anythin g
you can do to get it up is appropriate ' beha vior, then it is
not hard to see why the fiduc iary duty ha s become a burnt
o fferin g on the altar of stock prices. When s orporate
exec uti ves like Di sney's Eisner and Ovitz receive
million s of stock options, is there a relationship invo lvin g
Yo lcker ' s observation , corporate exec uti ve se lf-d ea lin g,
and subsequent fiduciary mi sconduct? When comparing
thi s w ith the exec utive corruption and billions in
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shareholder wealth transfers di sc ussed above, the culprit
may be those on the professorial platforms as much as the
pupils they taught so well (Bus iness Week, 2003). A 2003
survey of 2,700 Business Week readers discovered that
over half (53%) of the responders believe that present
business schools do not perform a good job of grounding
their graduates in ethi ca l busi ness practices. This same
survey fo und that 63% believed that most executives in
corporate America are " law-abiding citizens, who
sometimes place profits above moral s." An additional
28% said these same executi ves "would do just about
anything fo r a doll ar" (Business Week Online, Jan. 17,
2003).
A year later, a 2004 Wall Street Journal poll asked
"How much emphasis shou ld MBA programs place on
business ethics?" Thi s on line poll revealed that 81%
(1466 responders) indicated that "ethics courses should
be required of all students" (Weber, 2006).
Fix

The billions shareholders lost, the collapse of the
stock market in July 2002 (losing 1500 points in four
weeks on r ) Orts of mountin g corporate fiduciary
scandals). and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Ox ley Act
in January 2002 , all reflect a mass ive lack of confidence
by the American people in the integrity and execution of
corporate fiduciary responsibilities by business leaders
today. Frustrated with out-of-control and irresponsible
CEOs and board s of directors, Congress enacted a
co ll ective ethic of accountabi li ty in Sarbanes-Oxley
imposing new and costl y proced ures to stem thi s
behavior.
What wou ld the late Wa lt Di sney say about all this?
He mi ght say that it is time to go back to school to relearn the basics. Somehow academia has foc used on the
mean s of corporate Ameri can business whi le losi ng sight
of its goal - service to the cons umer, the investors, the
emp loyees, and the economy as the eng ine of democracy
(Khurana , 2004).
Can ethics be taught or is it inherent or intuitive?
Business basics have tradi ti onall y included business
ethi cs, that is - the moral compass of who you are in the
dark when no one else is watching; that which gu ides
yo ur dec ision-making when determinin g right from
wrong busin ess dec isions (Weber, 2006). When
review in g our respec ti ve business curricul a, what place
and rol e do ethics play? Whose ethics are we teaching, or
more importantl y, should we be teaching? Should it be
Gordon Gekko 's relativi sm - that individuals judge for
themse lves what is ri ght and wro ng exc lusive of external
consid erati ons, or utilitarianism -holding that the course
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of action seeking the greatest good for the most people is
the appropriate ethical approach , or should it be Kantian
duty-based standards of conduct that maintain the
proposed action is ethical if everyone could universally
exercise it?
At this moment in business hi story, thi s is the most
important subject we should be di scussing, debating, and
forming a united academic consensus on . This consensus
should be for the purpose of changing the direction that
has brought so much fiduciary di sservi ce to our
profession, the economy, and our people. The most
successful companies hi storically appear to be those
characterizing their most treasured value as being
"service." Profit is without question an indi spensabl e
component or reward to business service, but o ur
teaching error has led to the displacement of the "service"
theme, focus , and corporate purpose.
Gordon Gekko and hi s apostles are wrong. Greed is
not good for America . Greed, unchecked and unbalanced ,
harms workers, shareholders, consumers, and the public
as Wall Street' s endless fiduciary scandal s more than
adequately demonstrate. In the ABC News documentary
"Greed- Is It Necessarily Bad?" Atlanta billionaire Ted
Turner observed "that a littl e greed is good for all
Americans," explaining that sel £-interest is a good
motivational interest in busi ness (ABC News, 200 3) . But
where ·s the demarcation between "a little" and
"excessive" greed? A relevant Jesuit aphori sm observes
"everything in moderation , nothing in excess."
If companies are going to engage in voluntary
compliance, it is because peopl e at the top of the
corporation are go ing to have a culture of integrity
(Kleiner, 1997). The question becomes, then, " how do we
create this "culture of integri ty?" Greed aside, the recent
Hewlett-Packard ethics scandal in vo lving senior
executives reflects a culture of "anythin g goes."
Determined to di scover the ource of information leaks
occurring among its board of directors, HP executives set
up bogus email s, spied on joumalists using former FBf
agents, and engaged in pretextin g - in vesti ga tors
requesting information from operators over the phone
pretendin g to be someone e lse. Testi fy in g before a
congressional investigation com mittee, fom1er HP
chairman Patricia Dunn stated ''I be li eve these methods
may be quite co mmon ," she sa id of pretexting, ''a t
companies around the country" (Wa ll Street Journ a l,
2006). [Based on Catherine Pratt- latest ethi cs scandal.]

ethics has a positi ve effect in the workplace. One recent
study in volved accountin g giant KPMG . Perhaps infected
with some of the ethi ca l virus that ca used Arthur
Andersen to succumb , KPMG , one of the Big Fo ur
accounting firms , experienced its own signifi cant
emotional event when it remorsefull y entered into a
settlement agreement on August 29, 2005, with the U.S .
Department of Justice and Internal Revenue Service to
pay fines totaling $456 million involving KPMG's sale of
fraudul ent tax shelters (KPMG, 2005) . Perhaps reali zin g
somethin g seemed wrong over time at KPMG in its
ethical climate, management conducted a Forensic
Integrity Survey to determine: (I) How prevalent are
incidents of fra ud or misconduct; (2) Have conditions
that facilitate the preventi on of, and response to fraud and
mi sconduct changed since 2000 ; and (3) Are ethi cs and
complian ce programs having any effect (KPMG Forensic
Integrity Survey, 2005)?
The 2005-06 survey is based on over 4000 responses
from KPMG employees nation wi de. It states, "Our
indu stry wide data del ves into perceptions regarding the
preva lence, prevention, and detec ti on of mi sconduct , as
well as corporate reactions and tone at the top" (KPMG
Cover Letter, 2006). There were three key findings:
•

•

•

Does Teaching Ethics Work ?
There is empiri ca l evidence demonstrating teac hin g
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Nearly three out of four empl oyees nationall y - 74% - reported they had observed misconduct in
compan ies where they were working in the prior 12month peri od, with half the employees reporting that
what they had observed coul d cause "a significa nt
loss of publi c trust if discovered ." These observations
are virtua lly unchan ged from employee observations
in 2000.
Although the level of observed mi scon duct has
remained constant, employee reported that the
cond itions that faci li tate management' s ability to
p1event, detect, and respond to fra ud and misconduct
improved since 2000. Some of those conditi ons
involve (a) degree of pressure to do whatever it takes
to meet targets; (b) lack of understand ing of
standards that app ly to their jobs; (c) belief that
policies and procedures are easy to bypass; (d) beli ef
that reward are based on re ults, not the mean s to
achieve them: among others.
Emp loyees who
work 111
companie
with
co mprehen sive ethics and complia nce programs
reported more fa vorable results across the board than
those employees who work without such programs.
For in stance, employees who work in co mpan ies wi th
ethi cs programs repo rted fewer observations of
misconduct and hi gher leve ls of confidence in
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management 's commitme nt to
Leaders hip M essage 2006).
Exa minin g th e findin gs
Forens ic S urvey found:

•

•

•

•

•

111

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the
T readway C ommi ss ion. COSO addresses ethics and
compli ance program e lements in components that have a
perva sive influence on corporate be havior. They indicate
we sho uld be teachin g:

integrity (KPM G

(3) more close ly, the

E thics and compli ance programs have a favorab le
impac t on reducing the preva lence of mi sconduct in
o rganizations - observed mi sconduc t in prior 12
mon ths : 65% without progra m, 59% w ith program ;
observed vio la ti ons of orga ni zational values and
principles in prior 12 month s: 55% witho ut program,
43 % with program.
Ethics and compli ance programs have a favorab le
impact on miti gating the cond itions that g ive ri se to
mi sconduct - fee l press ure to do w hatever it takes to
meet targets : 60% witho ut progra m, 50% with ;
believe rewards are based on results, not the means
used to ach ieve the m : 57% wi thout, 41 % with
program;
E thi cs and co mpli ance progra ms have a favora ble
impact on
employee
wi llin gness to report
m iscond uct- would feel comfortab le reportin g
mi sconduct to s upervisor: 48% wi tho ut program ,
88% with progra m; feel co mfortable reportin g to
intern a l audit: 19% witho ut, 63% with progra m;
comfortabl e reporting to board o f directors: 20%
without, 59% w ith progra m .
E thi cs a nd compli ance program s have a favo rab le
impact on Empl oyee pe rcepti ons of the o utcomes o f
re portin g mi sco nduct - be li eve appropriate action
wou ld be taken: 44% witho ut, 87% with progra m;
b e li e ve they would be doing the ri ght thin g: 65%
witho ut, 92% with progra m .
E thic s a nd comp lian ce progra ms ha ve a favo rab le
impact of e mpl oyee per ception s of the to ne at the
top- b elie ve CEO and othe r execs set ri ght to ne o n
e thi cs and integrity: 29% without, 84% with
program; beli eve CEO a nd oth er execs va lue ethi cs
a nd integri ty over short-te rm bu s iness goa ls: 28%
w ithout, 82% with prOb,'Ta m (Webe r, 2006).

•

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

T he impo rtance of establi shing the ethi cs tone by the
board of directors and manage ment
Usefuln ess of establi shing codes of conduct and other
poli cies regardin g acceptabl e business practices
T he level at w hi ch e mployees should be made aware
of mana gement' s expec tation s
How to address pressure to meet unreali stic or shortterm performance targets?
How to address management ' s attempts to override
estab li shed co ntTo ls?
T he extent to wh ich ad herence to the code of conduct
sho uld be a crite rion in performance appraisal s
How ma nage ment sho uld be monitoring whether
inte rnal contro l syste ms are working?
T he importan ce of estab lishing channel s for people to
repo1i s uspected improprieties
What ' spon ses invo lvin g re medial action are
appropriate wh en address in g violations of the
co mpa ny code o f conduc t?

If thi s is part of w hat bus in ess fa cul ty today should be
teachin g abo ut ethi cs and comp li ance programs, what
other methodo logy o pportuniti es mi ght be use ful for
edu catio na l ex plo itati on?
Recomme ndatio ns for an Et hi cs R evival
T he fo ll ow in g is a list o f reco mmendations that if
impl e me nted , wo uld make aca demi a more respons ive to
th e needs of the pub li c and investors :
•

•

Wha t Ca n We Teach T hat Matters In volving E thi cs?
Acco un tin g, lega l e nvironme nt , and bu sin ess law
facu lty s ho uld teac h the requi re me nts o f the SarbanesOxley Ac t, a nd in pa rti c ul ar Sec tion 404. T hi s nrov is ion
requires compa ni es and th e ir a uditors to e va lu ate th e
effecti ve ness of th e ir inte rn a l contTo l ove r fina nc ial
reportin g ba sed on a suita ble co ntTo l fram e work. In
s upport of thi s, most co mpani es in th e U .S. are ap p ly in g
the integrated contro l fra me work developed by the
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Forn1ul ate and teac h a Business Ethi cs co urse during
th e bu s iness stude nt 's first or second year (idea ll y in
an lntTod ucti on to Bus in ess course) (Bus iness Week,
.J an. 22, 2003)
Imbed ethics prob le ms o r ga mes such as Prisoners'
Dil e mm a (thi s is a ty pe of no n-zero -sum ga me in
w hi c h two players ca n "coope rate" with or "defect"
(i .e. betray) the other p layer. Th e onl y concern of
eac h indi vidua l player ("pri
) soner" is max imi zin g
hi s/he r OW11 pa yo ff, w itho ut a ny concem for the other
player's pa yo ff) in eac h course taught in business
sc hoo ls; in clu de ethi cs in ex it o r profi cienc y exa ms
(Busiek,
ness We
Jan. 17, 2003)
O ffe r ad va nced co urses in busin ess ethi cs that
c ha ll enge a stu dent 's mo ral co mpass requ iring a
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•

•

•

•

•

foundation with which to make difficult fiduciary
decisions
Establish a student service-learning proj ect during the
senior year in business school to integrate in a
practical setting the knowledge, principles, and ethics
of a four-year business curriculum teaching the
aspirational service ethic, not the moral minimum of
ever more profit (Weber, 2006)
Increase the number of symposia, lectureships, and
similar programs, which give specific attention to
ethics and value issues. These should offer "real
scenarios- students understand the point
world"
better when they get to speak with and hea r fro m
individuals that have actuall y dealt wi th situati ons
you discuss in class (Weber, 2006)
Increase professors ' awareness of their sign ificance
as role models for students. If professors take ethi cs
more seriously, then students will do the same
School of Business faculty should conduct annua ll y a
continuing business education workshop to update
themselves on the requirements of SOX (SarbanesOxley Act) and judic ial enforcement actions
involving fid uciary ob ligation s
Create a li st of "Guiding
es"
Princ ipl
that illustrate
how management can appl y ethi ca l standards of
conduct, and defme " the way mana ge ment works."
These Guiding princ ipl es sho uld contain princ ipl es
such as uphold the law , create a culture o f open and
honest communication , do the ri ght thing, report
results accurately, and build trust and credibili ty

person - or even Pluto, con clude that the board of
directors exerci sed " utmost good faith " in their fidu ciary
duti es, actin g with the care an ordinaril y prudent person
would in handlin g $ 140 million of Mickey 's and hi s
fri ends' assets?
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